New York Times Coverage of Forensic Sciences

This week, The New York Times is running a series of articles regarding the ability of certain forensic sciences to make accurate conclusions. The Indignant Indigent has written in the past about two forensic sciences that are very important to criminal investigations, but often produce faulty or skewed results.

First, the Indignant Indigent has reported on the growing tide of skepticism regarding the field of firearm and toolmark identification. The New York Times covers the subject here. The article includes remarks from various scientists who conclude that firearm and toolmark examination has not been properly supported by independent scientific research and who further conclude that the field is lacking in statistical support for its most basic claims.

Second, the Indignant Indigent has reported on the various techniques used by law enforcement to extract confessions from criminal suspects (commonly known as the "Reid Technique"). The New York Times reports on new studies which call into question some of the Reid Techniques' basic assumptions. The article is available here.

The articles also contain an internet podcast of a discussion between experts in various forensic sciences.

Court of Appeals Refuses to Vacate Sentence After Catu Violation

In People v. Paul Boyd, the defendant pleaded guilty and only afterward was informed that post-release supervision ["PRS"] was "mandatory". Mr. Boyd was not informed of the required length of the PRS. Later, at sentencing, the judge altogether forgot to impose PRS. On appeal, the defendant sought to withdraw his plea under People v. Catu and People v. Louree.

One might expect an immediate reversal since this case appears to squarely fit within Catu's and Louree's framework. However, if anyone thought that, he would be wrong. In Boyd, the court analyzed the potential impact of Sparber and Garner on future Catu claims, questioned whether Penal Law § 70.85 was constitutional, and ultimately denied the requested relief, ordering the case for return to Supreme Court for litigation of the 70.85. The court said:

"This corrective action [vacatur of the plea] should not be entertained at this time because the constitutionality of this new provision and its applicability to this case have not been sufficiently developed for our review. Although a dissenting colleague believes that Penal Law § 70.85 is unconstitutional as applied to this case (see Pigott, J., dissenting op at 4), we recognize that the issue of whether the deficiency in the plea allocution can be rectified by granting defendant specific performance of the plea agreement—a determinate sentence without imposing a term of PRS—should be determined by Supreme Court in the first instance"

This is an interesting outcome given the fact that Catu is less than five years old and given the fact that the defendant never requested any relief under Sparber (i.e. re-sentencing). The court did not overrule Catu, but it clearly refused to apply the case when faced nearly identical circumstances. Judge Pigott recognized this anomaly in dissent and stated:

"our holdings in Catu and Van Deusen and more recently in Hill make clear that a defendant is entitled to vacatur of his plea when the court commits a Catu error. Although I dissented in Hill, we are bound by this recent precedent. "

Penal Law 70.85, designed to permit re-sentencing of almost every PRS mis-step, has thrown a monkey-wrench into the Court of Appeals' jurisprudence. Specifically, troublesome to the court is that portion of the statute which permits the court to impose a sentence that does not include PRS if the district attorney supports such a result. The court recognized that ultimately, the defendant's sentence could be one that does not include PRS, assuming the government agreed (as it appeared likely to do). Although neither the defendant nor the government sought re-setencing under this provision (or for any other reason), the court reversed and remanded "to give the People the opportunity to litigate their argument regarding the applicability of Penal Law § 70.85 and for defendant to assert any constitutional challenges to the operation of the statute".

It seems safe to say that the Court of Appeals is willing to hear constitutional challenges to the statute. Any takers?

Sentence Vacated For Failure to Conduct Outley Hearing

In People v. Daniel Davis, the defendant pleaded guilty and was given the standard warning that if he was re-arrested before his return for sentencing, his sentencing promise of probation would disappear in favor of a possible one year term of incarceration. Sure enough, the defendant was re-arrested before sentencing. The court imposed the one year sentence and refused defense counsel's request to "controvert the legality or reasonableness of the arrest". The Fourth Department vacated the sentence and returned the matter for an Outley hearing by stating in relevant part:

"Where, as here, 'an issue is raised concerning the validity of the post-plea charge or there is a denial of any involvement in the underlying crime, the court must conduct an inquiry at which the defendant has an opportunity to show that the arrest is without foundation' (Outley, 80 NY2d at 713). The mere fact that defendant was arrested, without more, is insufficient to justify an enhanced sentence based on a post-plea arrest (id.)"

Single Instance of Ineffectiveness Results in Reversal

A single instance of ineffectiveness on the part of trial counsel will result in reversal in only a limited number of circumstances. Defining what type of single error should result in reversal is an issue that appears to be still unresolved. For example, in People v. Turner (5 NY3d 476 [2005]), one of the more recent treatments of the subject, the Court of Appeals held that an attorney's failure to raise a valid statute of limitations defense constituted a single egregious instance of ineffectiveness. By contrast, in People v. Hobot (84 NY 2d 1020 [1995]), the court ruled that defense counsel’s single error in failing to review a medical document important to the impeachment of a prosecution witness did not rise to the level of a single instance of ineffectiveness required for reversal (see also, People v. Flores, 84 NY 2d 184 [1994]). After Turner, it remains unclear whether mathematical certainty of success is required to win on the "single egregious error" theory of ineffectiveness or whether some lesser quantum of likely success is required.

Although Turner would seem to suggest that mathematical certainty of success is required, the Fourth Department's decision in People v. Spartacus Brown suggests otherwise. In Brown, the Fourth Department reversed for a single instance of ineffectiveness when, in a prosecution for sexual abuse in the first degree, "defense counsel[] fail[ed] to object to the admission in evidence of the victim's medical records, which contained information concerning prior allegations of sexual abuse against defendant". This decision is, perhaps, further evidence that the Court of Appeals should clarify its application of the "single egregious error" theory.

Rape in the First Degree Deemed Inclusory Concurrent Count

In People v. Henry Scott, the Fourth Department reversed a conviction for Rape in the First Degree on the grounds that it was an inclusory concurrent count of Predatory Sexual Assault Against a Child. The Court explained that:

"the predatory sexual assault count charged rape in the first degree as one of its elements and, as charged in the indictment, the elements of the predatory sexual assault with respect to rape in the first degree are precisely those required for rape in the first degree under Penal Law § 130.35 (4). Thus, it was impossible for defendant to commit predatory sexual assault against a child without, by the same conduct, committing rape in the first degree..."

New Link Regarding Challenges to Firearm Examiner's Testimony

The Indignant Indigent has added two news link to the "Resources" toolbar at the right entitled "Challenging Firearms Examiners" (two parts). The links lead to two articles by Professor Adina Schwartz of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice that appeared last year in the New York State Defender's Association publication, The Champion. In the articles, Professor Schwartz points out the weaknesses inherent to any firearms examiner's testimony and provides scientific evidence to support the position that no firearms examiner can reliably testify that he has found the one-and-only weapon that discharged a particular bullet or shell casing. The articles should be required reading for any attorney before cross-examining a firearms expert. You can also find the articles here and here.

It should also be known that three recent federal cases highlight the problems inherent in firearms identification and suggest that such testimony is vulnerable to legal challenges despite its having been long accepted in evidence, often without much debate (see US v. Glynn, 578 F Supp 2d 567 [SDNY 2008]; US v Montiero, 407 F Supp 2d 351, 355 [Dist Mass 2006]; and US v Green, 405 F Supp 2d 104).

Rare Reversal for Prosecutorial Misconduct

On April 24, 2009, the Fourth Department took the rare step of reversing a conviction on the grounds of partially unpreserved instances of prosecutorial misconduct. In People v. Kevin R. Morrice, "the prosecutor asked the witness if she was 'getting anything in return for [her] cooperation of telling the truth,' and she responded '[n]ot at all.' In fact, that witness was an accomplice and had received transactional immunity in exchange for her testimony before the grand jury (see CPL 50.10 [1]; 190.40 [2]). The prosecutor had an obligation to correct the misstatement of that witness but failed to do so." Then, "he compounded his misconduct in failing to correct the misstatement by telling the jury during summation that the witness was 'getting nothing out of having testified in this case'."

Later, "[t]he prosecutor also engaged in misconduct when he [twice] questioned a police detective on direct examination with respect to defendant's invocation of the right to counsel."

To make matters worse, "[t]he prosecutor further engaged in misconduct when he asked a defense witness on cross-examination whether she had ever been arrested for a crime", and then scolded the witness for only answering regarding whether she had ever been convicted of a crime.

As if this was not enough, "[t]he prosecutor also engaged in misconduct when he questioned that witness concerning whether her boyfriend was currently incarcerated, and he exceeded the bounds of legitimate advocacy during summation by characterizing defendant as a liar (see People v Fiori, 262 AD2d 1081; People v Bonilla, 170 AD2d 945, lv denied 77 NY2d 904)."

The court noted that although reversal is not the desired remedy for prosecutorial misconduct, "it is nevertheless mandated when the conduct of the prosecutor has caused such substantial prejudice to the defendant that he [or she] has been denied due process of law".

More posts to come over the next two days.

Conviction Reversed for Two Miranda Violations

In People v. Patrick Bungo, the defendant was arrested by his parole officer for having violated the terms of an order of protection issued in favor of his ex-wife. The police locked Mr. Bungo in the backseat of a police car with two other officers and inquired regarding his alleged contact with the ex-wife. The next day, the same parole officer confronted Mr. Bungo in the local jail regarding the incident. On both occassions, the defendant made incriminating statements without having been given Miranda warnings.

In reversing Mr. Bungo's conviction on Miranda grounds, the Fourth Department ruled:

" The first statement was made by defendant after he had been arrested and was in custody but before he had received his Miranda warnings, and the statement was made in response to questions that were " likely to elicit an incriminating response' " (People v Wearen, 19 AD3d 1133, 1134, lv denied 5 NY3d 834; see People v Evans, 294 AD2d 918, 919, lv dismissed 98 NY2d 768; People v Rifkin, 289 AD2d 262, lv denied 97 NY2d 759). The second statement was made at the Monroe County jail, before any Miranda warnings had been administered. The record establishes that it also was the result of custodial interrogation inasmuch as it "involve[d] the kind of inherently coercive atmosphere with which Miranda was most concerned" (People v Alls, 83 NY2d 94, 99, cert denied 511 US 1090; see People v Vila, 208 AD2d 781, lv denied 85 NY2d 867; People v Connor, 157 AD2d 739, lv denied 76 NY2d 732)."

Not an Abuse of Discretion to Deny Request for Adjournment

In People v. James Comfort, the Fourth Department affirmed the defendant's conviction and rejected his claim that he was denied due process and his right to a fair trial following the trial court's repeated denial of requests for adjournments. The Fourth Department noted that:

"The court granted defendant's "demand[]" for a new attorney approximately two weeks before trial was scheduled to commence, and defense counsel accepted the assignment with knowledge of the time constraints. We thus conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant the requested adjournments (see People v Arroyave, 49 NY2d 264, 272; People v Povio, 284 AD2d 1011, lv denied 96 NY2d 923)."

The court's decision raises an interesting (and possibly leave-worthy) issue of whether the Fourth Department can properly analyze such a request, couched in due process terms, under the "abuse of discretion" standard. In People v. Foy (32 NY 2d 473 [1973]), the Court of Appeals stated that

“recent decisions of this Court reflect a more liberal policy in favor of granting a short adjournment... when the delay is requested in order to insure [sic] a fundamental right”.

There appears to be some dispute, even in other departments, over how or when this limitation on typically broad judicial discretion should apply.

Insufficent Evidence of Filing a False Instrument

In People v. Alexis Oberlander, the Fourth Department determined that there was legally insufficient evidence of filing a false instrument in the first degree. The government's allegation was that Ms. Oberlander defrauded county welfare services by failing to note on her application for DSS that she shared her home with another adult. The court noted that:

"Two prosecution witnesses who were frequent visitors at defendant's residence, including one who stayed at defendant's residence for a few months, testified that Banks lived at defendant's residence, and defendant's landlord testified that he believed that Banks lived at the residence. The basis for the testimony of those prosecution witnesses, however, was only that they often observed Banks at defendant's residence. The People failed to present other evidence to support the conclusion of those witnesses that Banks lived at defendant's residence, e.g., evidence that Banks received his mail at the residence, performed household chores, or paid household bills (cf. People v Hure, 16 AD3d 774, 775, lv denied 4 NY3d 854; Stumbrice, 194 AD2d at 933). "

The court further noted that the defendant's evidence contradicted the government's position:

"although Banks was often at her residence and slept there 2 to 3 nights per week, he did not live there and spent the remainder of the time at another woman's home or at the homes of his family members. Three other defense witnesses who were often at defendant's residence testified that Banks was frequently at the residence but that they did not observe any of his personal effects there, nor did they have any knowledge that he lived there. A fourth defense witness testified that she rarely saw Banks at defendant's residence and had no knowledge that he lived with defendant."

The court also reversed and granted a new trial on the one remaining count on the grounds that the trial court refused to grant a short adjournment to accommodate a defense witness.

Judge's Promise of Harsher Sentence After Trial Coerced Plea

In People v. Gunther Flinn, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted murder in the second degree. During his plea, the judge said that if Mr. Flinn was convicted after trial, he would a be treated "very differently as far as the sentence is concerned" if he exercised his right to a trial and that his sentence after trial would be "nothing like the sentence that [he] would get if [he] stood up and accepted [his] responsibility." The judge further said that after trial Mr. Flinn would be sentenced to "substantially longer than" the sentence he would receive after a plea.

Although Mr. Flinn did not seek to withdraw his plea before the lower court, the Fourth Department addressed the issue of his entitlement to withdrawal in the interests of justice and vacated the plea by stating:

"the court's statements do not amount to a description of the range of the potential sentences but, rather, they constitute impermissible coercion, "rendering the plea involuntary and requiring its vacatur" (People v Fanini, 222 AD2d 1111; see People v Stevens, 298 AD2d 267, 268, lv dismissed 99 NY2d 585; People v Wilson, 245 AD2d 161, 163, lv denied 91 NY2d 946)."

New Link Regarding DOJ Standards for Eyewitness Identification Procedures

The Indignant Indigent has added a new link in the "Resources" tool bar to the right. The link is to the Department of Justice's 1999 guidebook for law enforcement on the use of pre-trial identification procedures. The 55 page publication proposes protocols for law enforcement when speaking to eyewitnesses. The publication implicitly and explicitly acknowledges that even subtly improper identification procedures can result in skewed eyewitness memory.

A Discussion On Fundamental Fairness

It is worth reading yesterday's oral argument at the Supreme Court in the case of Caperton v. AT Massey Coal Company. At issue is whether a West Virginia appellate court judge should have recused himself after having received $3 million in campaign contributions from one of the parties. The case involves an intricate discussion of basic concepts of fundamental fairness and the impact of the election process on outcomes in litigation. Moreover, the case was expertly argued by two exceptional attorneys, Theodore B. Olson and Andrew L. Frey.

Weight of the Evidence Win... Almost.

In People v. Jones, the Third Department took the rare action of reversing a conviction on the grounds that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The appellate court determined that the government failed to disprove the defendant's claim of justification. The court said:

"no evidence was presented to counter defendant's and Walker's testimony that Lamphear was the initial aggressor in this attack. In addition, it is uncontroverted that before defendant ever took out the knife, Lamphear had not only repeatedly threatened him, but physically assaulted him and Walker with his fist, and then attacked defendant with a wooden board striking him so hard that he fractured defendant's arm. Moreover, there is no evidence to support the conclusion that defendant had it in his power to retreat before being attacked by Lamphear and prior to his being struck repeatedly with the board. There is also no question that defendant struck Lamphear only once with the knife and that this occurred as defendant was fending off Lamphear's attack and attempting to safely leave the scene (see People v Richardson, 55 AD3d at 935; Matter of Ismael S., 213 AD2d at 169)."

Note the discussion of the defendant's lawful use of the knife. Be sure to read the very last paragraph where it is revealed that the appellate attorney failed to raise any issue arguing that the defendant's use of the knife was not unlawful. The appellate division did not reverse the weapons possession charge because:

"while the mere possession of a pocket knife is not a crime and is only transformed into criminal conduct upon a showing that the weapon was possessed "with intent to use the same unlawfully against another" (Penal Law § 265.01 [2]), we note that defendant has failed to present any specific arguments on this appeal challenging his conviction for criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree."

Third Department: Insufficient Evidence of Intent to Sell Heroin

In People v. McCoy, decided February 26th, the Third Department determined that there was insufficient evidence that the defendant possessed heroin with the intent to sell it. The court said:

"the People presented no direct proof that defendant sold or attempted to sell heroin to any individual. [Officer] Gaulin did not testify to observing such a transaction, nor did [Eyewitness] David. And, notably, although David testified that she had observed a male standing outside the door for about half an hour and that she saw him speak to several people whom she described as behaving nervously, she was not able to describe the man at trial not even his race and she was unable to identify defendant as the man in question."

The court went on to say that intent to sell could not even be inferred from the circumstances presented at trial:

"Nor is there legally sufficient evidence from which to infer defendant's intent to sell heroin. At the time of his arrest, defendant was carrying no cash beyond a few coins (see People v Jones, 47 AD3d 961, 964 [2008], lvs denied 10 NY3d 808, 812 [2008]; People v Mendoza, 5 AD3d 810, 813-814 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 644 [2004]). No evidence was presented that he possessed a weapon or any paraphernalia commonly associated with the sale of drugs (see People v Jones, 47 AD3d at 964; People v Hawkins, 45 AD3d 989, 991 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 1034 [2008]; People v Barton, 13 AD3d 721, 723 [2004], lv denied 5 NY3d 785 [2005]; People v Tarver, 292 AD2d 110, 114 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 702 [2002]). And, significantly, no testimony established that the small quantity of heroin found in his possession was inconsistent with personal use (see People v Patchen, 46 AD3d 1112, 1113 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 814 [2008]; People v Barton, 13 AD3d at 723; People v Tarver, 292 AD2d at 114)."

Court of Appeals Upholds Persistent Felony Offender Statute... Again

On February 24, in People v. Quinones, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its previous holdings that the state's discretionary persistent felony offender [PFO] statute does not violate Apprendi v. New Jersey (530 US 466 [2000]). In Apprendi, the court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt" (Apprendi, 530 US at 490). New York has a two-step PFO statute, Penal Law 70.10, wherein the court must first determine whether the defendant had been previously convicted of two or more felonies. Then, the court must determine whether "the history and character of the defendant and the nature of the circumstances of his criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration and life-time supervision will best serve the public" (70.10[2]). Although it would appear that the second prong authorizes a sentence enhancement made by a judge regarding facts other than those found by the trial jury, the Court of Appeals disagreed and held:

"Taking the foregoing into account, defendant's argument that the higher persistent felony offender range cannot be imposed without judicially-found facts regarding the "nature and circumstances" of defendant's criminal conduct and defendant's "history and character" misses the point. Unlike the sentencing schemes in Apprendi, Ring, Blakely, Booker and Cunningham, all of which effectively provided for judicial factfinding of an element(s) of an offense as a prerequisite to enhancing a sentence beyond the relevant sentencing range, the New York sentencing scheme, after a defendant is deemed eligible to be sentenced as a persistent felony offender, requires that the sentencing court make a qualitative judgment about, among other things, the defendant's criminal history and the circumstances surrounding a particular offense in order to determine whether an enhanced sentence, under the statutorily prescribed sentencing range, is warranted. Stated differently, New York's sentencing scheme, by requiring that sentencing courts consider defendant's "history and character" and the "nature and circumstances" of defendant's conduct in deciding where, within a range, to impose an enhanced sentence, sets the parameters for the performance of one of the sentencing court's most traditional and basic functions, i.e., the exercise of sentencing discretion."

The Supreme Court of the United States has denied cert following the two previous times the Court of Appeals upheld the statute (see People v. Rosen, 96 NY 2d 329 [2001], cert denied, 534 US 899 [2001]; People v. Rivera, 5 NY 3d 61 [2005], cert denied, 546 US 984 [2005]).

Mandatory Surcharge Not Part of a Defendant's "Sentence"

In People v. Guerrero, the defendant was sentenced without the judge ever having mentioned that he was required to pay the mandatory surcharges and fees that typically accompany a criminal conviction in New York State. At the Court of Appeals, he challenged whether the Court of Appeals' prior decision in People v. Sparber would permit collection of those fees when the judge's sentence did not include any mention of the surcharge and fee. In Sparber, the court ruled that the trial court must pronounce a sentence of post-release supervision in order for it to become part of a defendant's legal sentence (even if the term of PRS was otherwise required by statute).

The rule in Sparber does not apply in Guerrero, however, because:

"We now hold that the mandatory surcharge and crime victim assistance fee mandated by Penal Law § 60.35 (1) are not a part of a sentence within the meaning of sections 380.20 and 380.40 of the CPL; therefore, a judge need not pronounce them in a defendant's presence during sentencing".

The Court further explained:

"the statute's nomenclature reinforces its non-punitive nature: the assessments imposed by section 60.35 (1) are called a "surcharge" or a "fee," not a "penalty." Indeed, when first enacted in 1982, Penal Law § 60.35 was entitled "Mandatory penalty assessment required in certain cases" (emphasis added). The very next year, the Legislature changed every statutory reference to "penalty assessment" in Penal Law § 60.35 and CPL 420.35 to "mandatory surcharge" (see L 1983, ch 15, §§ 2 and 3 [emphasis added]). A "surcharge" is generally defined as "an additional tax, cost, or impost" (see Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1185 [10th ed 1996])."

This raises the question of whether a defendant can have his probation or parole revoked for failing to pay these fees since, as Guerrero explains, they are not penal in nature and are not intended to be punitive. (Special thanks to Second Assistant Public Defender Jill Paperno for bringing this case and its applicability in post-conviction proceedings to the Indignant Indigent's attention).

New Link Regarding Police Interrogation Practices

Please note that the Indignant Indigent has posted a new link in the "Resources" tool bar to the right. The new link is to the homepage of John E. Reid & Associates. John Reid is perhaps better known as the author of Criminal Interrogations and Confessions, the publication that serves as The Bible for police interrogations. The book is discussed at length in the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona (384 US 436 [1966]), especially in footnote #9.

Professor Reid periodically updates his webpage with new tips for investigators. You can find the tips by looking under the "Educational Information" tab and selecting "Investigator Tip". Professor Reid explores such topics as "Are you a good listener?", "Electronically Recorded Confessions", and "Do you invite people to lie to you?". There are literally dozens of tips for interrogators on the webpage, all in searchable format. The Indignant Indigent believes Professor Reid's book and these tips should be required reading for any criminal practitioner litigating a confession case.

State Supreme Court Justice Resigns

A Supreme Court Justice in Buffalo resigned this past weekend for his involvement in a scheme to cover up a local attorney's DWI. The Buffalo News reported the judge's resignation together with the details of the attorney's and her doctor's attempts to cover up the DWI.

COA: Evidence Suppressed After Police Exceed Scope of Investigatory Detention

In People v. Ricky Ryan, the police learned that there had been an early-morning carjacking, and based upon the descriptions and circumstances, suspected Mr. Ryan. Five hours after the carjacking, the police approached Mr. Ryan, asked him to be seated in the backseat of a police car, photographed him, and held him while the victim of the car-jacking viewed the photo. The entire process took 13 minutes, and Mr. Ryan was never informed that he was free to leave or that he would be free to leave in the immediate future. The police further told Mr. Ryan that he was being held while the police were speaking to another potential witness. Mr. Ryan later confessed to the carjacking.

Judge Ciparick, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the conviction and stated in relevant part:

"Proper administration of the photo array did not require defendant's presence and, in fact, the police officer did not even know that the non-victim witness had become available to view the photo array when defendant's detention began. Nor were there any other exigencies that might have permitted holding defendant while the photo array was conducted (cf. People v Allen, 73 NY2d 378, 379-380 [1989]; People v Behrmann, 264 AD2d 682, 682 [1st Dept 1999]). Thus, the only permissible inference that can be drawn is that this detention was undertaken simply to make it convenient for the police to arrest defendant if a positive identification subsequently occurred (see People v Robinson, 282 AD2d 75, 81 [1st Dept 2001] ["What the police did here, as a practical matter, was to place defendant under arrest in order to obtain sufficient evidence to arrest him"]). Accordingly, we conclude that, on the facts present here, defendant's detention exceeded the scope permitted under Hicks and that the photographs obtained during that detention must be suppressed."

The court suppressed the photographs, but remanded the case for an attentuation hearing regarding Mr. Ryan's statements.