CA: Recent "depraved indifference" decisions not retroactive

Policano v Herbert, 2006 NY Slip Op 08284 [available here]

In response to certified questions from the Second Circuit, the Court of Appeals holds that the Court's recent "depraved indifference" decisions--severely narrowing those factual scenarios supporting a "depraved indifference" murder conviction and holding that "depraved indifference" is a culpable mental state--should not be applied retroactively. From the decision:

[W]e must weigh three factors to determine whether a new precedent operates retroactively: the purpose to be served by the new standard; the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standard; and the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standard. The second and third factors are, however, only given substantial weight "when the answer to the retroactivity question is not to be found in the purpose of the new rule itself." "Thus, where otherwise there could be a complete miscarriage of justice, current constitutional standards that go to the heart of a reliable determination of guilt or innocence have been substituted for those in effect at the time of trial."

This is not such a case. The purpose of our new interpretation of "under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life" is to dispel the confusion between intentional and depraved indifference murder, and thus cut off the continuing improper expansion of depraved indifference murder. Moreover, in the words of the concurring judges in Suarez, the goal is to "make future homicide prosecutions more sustainable, increasing the likelihood that defendants who are proven beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed murder will be properly held to account for that crime." Further, "[d]efendants who commit[] vicious crimes but who may have been charged and convicted under the wrong section of the statute are not attractive candidates for collateral relief after their convictions have become final." In short, non-retroactivity poses no danger of a miscarriage of justice.

Finally, the other two Pepper factors strongly favor non-retroactivity. For two decades prosecutors relied on Register's objectively determined degree-of-risk formulation when making their charging decisions. In addition, retroactive application would potentially flood the criminal justice system with CPL 440.10 motions to vacate convictions of culpable intentional murderers who were properly charged and convicted of depraved indifference murder under the law as it existed at the time of their convictions.

(Policano, 2006 NY Slip Op 08284 [2006].)

New decisions from the Fourth Department tomorrow.

CA: City Court jury pools can be comprised of County residents

In re Oglesby v McKinney, 2006 NY Slip Op 08277 [available here]

City court defendants are not entitled to a jury made up solely of city residents; rather, "jurors for a criminal trial in a City Court may be selected from the residents of the county in which the city is located, including those who are not city residents." (Oglesby, 2006 NY Slip Op 08277.) So holds the Court of Appeals, in a decision affirming the Fourth Department (see my previous post here). The Court held that section 500 of the Judiciary Law "clearly does not command that all juries be selected county-wide, it seems to imply that selection from the county will be the norm, to which exceptions are possible." (Id.) The Court also noted that requiring City Court jury pools to be drawn solely from city residents would decrease the number of city residents available for felony jury pools in County Court--"[i]f all City Court jurors had to be Syracuse residents, the likely result would be to divert some Syracuse jurors from felony trial to misdemeanor trials in City Court--to the disappointment of those Syracuse defendants in felony cases who would prefer jurors from their home town." (Id.)

AD3: intoxication can negate "depraved indifference" mental state

People v Coon, 2006 NY Slip Op 07925 [3d Dept 2006] [available here]

Breaking with its prior precedent, the Court of Appeals recently held that "depraved indifference" is a culpable mental state. (See People v Feingold, 2006 NY Slip Op 05233 [previous post here].) In a decision handed down last week, the Third Department held that a necessary implication of the Court of Appeals' holding in Feingold is that intoxication can render a defendant incapable of forming the "depraved indifference" mens rea, and a defendant can now claim intoxication as a partial defense to crimes having "depraved indifference" as the culpable mental state. From the Third Department's decision:

After a nonjury trial, County Court's verdict included findings that defendant failed to prove the defense of mental disease or defect by a preponderance of the evidence, but that because of his voluntary use of crack cocaine, he suffered an atypical idiopathic reaction to the substance such that, at the time of the attack, he was experiencing cocaine intoxication delirium. As a result, County Court found that defendant was unable to form any specific criminal intent necessary to support either the intentional assault or criminal possession of a weapon charges. County Court also found that defendant's actions were reckless and that since voluntary intoxication does not negate recklessness, defendant was guilty of depraved indifference assault. [...]

[A]s defendant was too intoxicated to form a specific criminal intent, he also would be incapable of possessing the culpable mental state necessary to prove depraved indifference.

(Coon, 2006 NY Slip Op 07925.)

The Court also held that, given the nature of the assault (essentially a one-on-one stabbing), the evidence was insufficient to "establish [the] wanton cruelty, brutality or callousness" required for depraved indifference. (Id. at __.)

New decisions from the Fourth Department November 17, 2006.

2d Cir.: Autopsy report not "testimonial" under Crawford v Washington

US v Erbo, 2006 WL 3021118 [2d Cir 2006]

In a disappointing decision, the Second Circuit has held that autopsy reports are not "testimonial" statements within the meaning of Crawford v Washington because the reports can be classified as business records. The Second Circuit Blog has a full analysis of the decision here, and they were kind enough to quote from my previous post on this issue (available here). The language quoted from me by the Second Circuit Blog was taken from a brief where I argued this issue before the Fourth Department; the result in that case was similarly disappointing. (See People v Bryant, 27 AD3d 1124 [available here] [previous post here].)

When it decided People v Goldstein earlier this year, the New York Court of Appeals at least hinted that it would give "testimonial" a broader definition that would seemingly cover autopsy reports . (See People v Goldstein, 6 NY3d 119 [2005] [see my previous post on Goldstein here].) It might be a good idea to start preserving Crawford-type issues in State Constitutional terms, just in case the Court of Appeals decides to afford New York citizens greater protections under the State Confrontation Clause than the Second Circuit has read into the federal clause.

CA: Double jeopardy does not bar retrial where prosecutor's misconduct was not intended to provoke mistrial

In re Gorghan v Patricia DeAngelis, 2006 NY Slip Op 07516 [available here]

Even in cases of extreme and "deplorable" prosecutorial misconduct that results in reversal on appeal, a re-trial is not barred by double jeopardy unless it can be shown the prosecutor "deliberately intended to provoke a mistrial motion." So held the Court of Appeals last week in Gorghan v Patricia DeAngelis. I'm a little late on this one, but Nicole at Sui Generis has a breakdown of the decision here. I have always thought of this rule in terms of Madden football. Say you and your buddy are playing against each other in a game of Madden. The score is tied in the waning moments of the game. If while you are trying to kick the game winning field goal your buddy punches you in the face and causes you to miss, then that's the Gorghan case--your friend cheated, but he did it so he would have a chance to get the ball back and win a close game. The only fair thing to do in that case is to reset the game and play it again, with no punching involved. But what if you are beating your friend 42-0 in the last two minutes of the game, and your friend "accidentally" unplugs the Playstation? That's the Davis v Brown case (cited by the Court in Gorghan), and the proper remedy is to let the all-but-assured victory stand. The cheater does not get a second bite at the apple in that situation.

I can't believe Judge Kaye's decision didn't draw this analogy.

AD4: Legal sufficiency arguments still not preserved unless specific TOD made at end of all proof

People v Saxton, 2006 NY Slip Op 06972 [available here]

People v Smith, 2006 NY Slip Op 06979 [available here]

The Fourth Department continues to interpret People v Hines (97 NY2d 56) strictly, requiring defense counsel to not only make a specific motion for a trial order of dismissal at the end of the People's case, but also requiring that the motion be renewed at the close of all proof. Defense counsel in Saxton was doubly deficient, failing to make the specific argument advanced on appeal and failing to renew his TOD motion at the close of all proof. (Saxton, 2006 NY Slip Op 06972.) The Fourth Department ultimately reversed in Saxton, however, holding it was error for the trial court to summarily deny defense counsel's 330.30 motion where "[t]he sworn allegations in defendant's moving papers that defendant learned after the verdict was rendered that a juror had failed to disclose a past extramarital affair with a witness to the altercation between defendant and the victim required a hearing on the issue whether the juror's alleged misconduct prejudiced a substantial right of defendant." (Saxton, 2006 NY Slip Op 06972.)

AD4: Payroll documents improperly received as "business records", insufficient evidence to support welfare fraud conviction

People v Smith, 2006 NY Slip Op 06944 [available here]

In one of the few reversals from this packet, the Fourth Department reversed a defendant's conviction for welfare fraud based on an improperly admitted payroll document and a lack of evidence on the the amount of welfare benefits actually wrongfully received. A great result for Mr. Smith, no doubt, but the opinion is short on analysis and of thus of limited value as precedent. After stating the requirements for a business record (made in the regular course of business, it is the regular course of the business to make the record, and the record was made contemporaneous with the act), the Court simply concludes that "the People failed to establish both the second and third foundation requirements, and thus the payroll documents were improperly admitted." (People v Smith, 2006 NY Slip Op 06944.) The Court also dismissed certain counts of the indictment on legal sufficiency grounds, holding "the evidence is insufficient to establish the amount that defendant was paid by private employers while he received public assistance benefits, and thus the evidence is insufficient to establish the amount of benefits, if any, improperly received by defendant." (Id.)

AD4: Mere possession of defaced gun sufficient to prove defendant knew gun was defaced

People v Smith, 2006 NY Slip Op 07011 [available here]

To be guilty of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree ("CPW3") under subsection 3 of Penal Law 265.02, a defendant must possess the weapon with knowledge that "the weapon had been defaced." (Penal Law 265.02[3].) The Fourth Department held the defendant's mere possession of the visibly defaced gun was sufficient to establish that he knew it was defaced; from the decision:

[H]ere was no dispute that defendant possessed the defaced revolver on his person and that its condition was visible as he pointed it at the police officer in a shooter's stance. Photographs of the defaced revolver were admitted in evidence, and thus the jury was able to evaluate whether it was possible to possess the revolver without knowledge that its identifying features were illegible. "Generally, possession suffices to permit the inference that the possessor knows what he possesses, especially, but not exclusively, if it is in his [or her] hands". Moreover, "the recent and exclusive possession of the fruits of any crime warrants the inference of guilt, including . . . knowledgeable possession". "[I]t makes no significant difference . . . whether knowledge is presumed by statute or inferred by reasoning without the benefit of statutory presumption". Thus, we conclude that the People presented legally sufficient evidence that defendant knew that the revolver in his possession was defaced.

(Smith, 2006 NY Slip Op 07011.)

Yet another quasi-presumption that mere possession of a gun will give rise to in New York.

CA: Sandoval error subject to harmless error analysis

People v Grant, 2006 NY Slip Op 07394 [available here]

Where the "evidence of a defendant's guilt [is] overwhelming" and "there is nothing to which he could legitimately have testified that might have been believed by a jury", any Sandoval error will be considered harmless on appeal. So says the Court of Appeals in People v Grant,a decision handed down today. This is a continuation of the "really guilty man" flavor of harmless error analysis that started back in the Court's Wardlaw decision (holding denial of a defendant's right to counsel at suppression subject to harmless error analysis). In Grant, the Sandoval error could not have been more egregious; at defendant's trial for criminal contempt, the trial court ruled "that should defendant testify, the People would be permitted to impeach him by mention of his six prior criminal-contempt convictions." (Grant, 2006 NY Slip Op 07394.) Defense counsel then placed on the record that defendant would not be testifying because of the trial court's Sandoval ruling. The Court of Appeals agreed that the Sandoval ruling was erroneous, but found it to be harmless in this case. From the Court's decision:

We now hold explicitly [that] Sandoval error is properly subject to harmless-error analysis. At the outset, we note that although defendant claims that his constitutional right to testify in his own behalf was violated by the Court's Sandoval ruling, he never raised any constitutional claim before the trial court, thus failing to preserve this contention for our review. Accordingly, his current claim must be reviewed under the standard applicable to nonconstitutional harmless error. Under that standard, an error will be deemed harmless when the proof of guilt was overwhelming and there was no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted had the error not occurred. [...]

If, in a particular case, the factfinder is deprived of no significant material evidence, then the defendant has not been denied a fair trial and reversal of the conviction would serve no jurisprudential purpose. Assuming that the trial court here abused its discretion, we agree with the Appellate Division that any error was harmless, since defendant's decision not to testify did not deprive the jury of any 'critical information'. [...] The evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming. [...] Although defendant states in the abstract that he was "the sole source of his defense," he proffers no hint that he actually had any creditable defense, and offers no suggestion as to what it might have been. Plainly, on this record, there is nothing to which he could legitimately have testified that might have been believed by a jury.

(Id. at __.)

Judge R.S. Smith dissented, stating simply "I cannot accept the proposition that an error that prevented a defendant from telling his side of the story to a jury can ever be 'harmless.' [...] To hold that interference with the defendant's right to testify may be overlooked because of his failure to make a 'proffer' that the trial court finds 'creditable' is to sanction a trespass by the court on the jury's province that is not consistent with the way our system works." (Id. at __ [SMITH, J., dissenting].)

The upshot of this decision is that trial defense counsel must do at least two and preferably three things to even give his or her client a shot of obtaining meaningful appellate review of a trial court's Sandoval ruling: 1) put on the record that the defendant's decision not to testify was based on the trial court's Sandoval ruling, 2) make at least a limited proffer of defendant's testimony, and 3) put on the record that the trial court's Sandoval ruling is depriving defendant of his Constitutional right to present a defense and testify on his own behalf. That last one is critical, because it will (hopefully) trigger the stricter standard of harmless error review applicable to constitutional error (i.e. the reviewing court will have to find the Sandoval error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

And of course, in the Fourth Department a defendant must object to the trial court's "ultimate" Sandoval ruling to even preserve the issue for review in the first place. (See People v Mc Millon, 2006 NY Slip Op 06993 [available here].)

AD4: jury must be charged defendant has no duty to retreat if less-than-deadly force used in self-defense

People v Phillips, 2006 NY Slip Op 07051 [available here]

A defendant only has a duty to retreat to safety before acting in self-defense if he intends to use deadly physical force. If the self-defender just plans on defending with less than deadly physical force, he may do so even if capable of fleeing. In Phillips, the defendant was charged with assault, and argued that whatever injuries he inflicted were done in self-defense. The trial court charged the jury that defendant had a duty to retreat, and the Fourth Department reversed. "It is clear that the jury must determine whether a defendant could have retreated with complete safety only when a defendant uses deadly physical force . . . we conclude that the court's charge left the jury with no choice but to reject the justification defense, inasmuch as the evidence established that defendant did not retreat although he could have done so with complete safety." (Phillips, 2006 NY Slip Op 07051.)

Justice Centra named to AD4 bench

Governor Pataki designated Justice John V. Centra as a Justice of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department today. You can read the Governor's press release here. Also, the New York Law Journal is reporting here that Justice Scudder will likely be named Presiding Justice of the AD4 to replace Justice Pigott.

AD4: Officer bolstering is not bolstering if eyewitness is excited

People v Roseboro, 2006 NY Slip Op 06976 [available here]

It is well-settled that, as a general rule, a police officer is not allowed to bolster the identification testimony of an eyewitness. Thus, if an eyewitness testifies at trial to a positive identification of a defendant during a showup, the People are not allowed to call the police officer who conducted the showup to confirm that the eyewitness identified the suspect. It is bolstering, plain and simple.

In Roseboro, the police officer was allowed at trial to "confirm[...] the victim's identification of defendant at the hospital." (Roseboro, 2006 NY Slip Op 06976.) This is a classic bolstering issue. However, the Fourth Department affirmed defendant's conviction, finding the officer's testimony was admissible because the "identification by the victim was admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, i.e. it was 'made under the stress of excitement caused by an external event, and not the product of studied reflection and possible fabrication.'" (Id.) Fine, the eyewitnesses statement would come in over a hearsay objection. But that doesn't speak to the bolstering question--why is the cop allowed to confirm the eyewitness identification testimony, and how does the fact that the witness may have been excited when she made the identification figure in? The Fourth Department's decision is a non sequitor--the Court engages in a hearsay analysis to resolve a bolstering issue. I am at a loss to explain this one.

AD4: "second child sexual assault felony offender statement" timely in plea situation if it affords defendant opportunity to be heard

People v Armbruster, 2006 NY Slip Op 07055 [available here]

A relatively recent flavor of persistent felony sentencing is found in CPL 400.19[2], that allows harsher penalties for those defendants previously convicted of felony sexual assault against a child. Before seeking the harsher sentence, the People must file a statement "at any time before trial commences setting forth the date and placed of each [such] alleged predicate felony conviction . . . and a statement whether the defendant was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the predicate felony." (Armbruster, 2006 NY Slip Op 07055.) That's fine if you are standing trial for the present offense--but what if a defendant pleads guilty? The defendant in Armbruster argued that the statement must be filed before "the entry of a guilty plea." (Id.) The Fourth Department, while acknowledging that the statute did not provide for the guilty plea scenario, disagreed with defendant and instead concluded "that the CPL 400.19 statement is timely filed in the event that there is a guilty plea if it is filed within a sufficient time before the imposition of sentence to afford the defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard." (Id.) Even if the statement was required to be filed before entry of the guilty plea, the Fourth Department would have found the error harmless; importing reasoning employed to resolve this issue in more established recidivist sentence procedures, the Court held "'[w]here, as here, the statutory purposes for filing a predicate statement (i.e. [,] apprising the court of the prior conviction and affording defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard in connection with the predicate felony) are satisfied, strict compliance with [CPL 400.19] is not required.'" (Id. at __ [citations omitted].)

AD4: We know "custody" when we see it

In dealing with the legality of police-citizen encounters, it is critical to pinpoint the point of custody, i.e. the moment at which a reasonable, innocent person would no longer feel free to leave. The resolution of this "custody" question often resolves the legality of the police conduct--a whole slew of police actions and so-called "detentions" are permissible on less than probable cause so long as the suspect is not found to be in "custody" yet. Three decisions handed down by the Fourth Department this term highlight the contours of the Fourth Department's thinking on "custody" matters; the decisions are somewhat contradictory, but nonetheless provide useful guideposts.

People v Mc Clain, 2006 NY Slip Op 06947 [available here]

In People v Mc Clain, the defendant was seized by multiple police officers at gunpoint, handcuffed, frisked and transported back to the crime scene for a showup identification. (Mc Clain, NY Slip Op 06947.) The Fourth Department held that the police conduct amounted to a full arrest justifiable only on a showing of probable cause--"the actions of the police officers in drawing their guns, handcuffing and frisking defendant, and transporting defendant, while handcuffed, to the scene of the robbery amounted to an arrest of defendant." (Id.) This is a welcome decision from the AD4, because usually in a case where a defendant is detained (however forcefully) only briefly for purposes of conducting a showup identification, mid-level appellate courts will cite to the seminal Court of Appeals decision in People v Hicks and justify the so-called "temporary investigative detention" on a lesser showing of reasonable suspicion. Hey, wait a minute . . . that's exactly what the Fourth Department did in . . .

People v Wiley, 2006 NY Slip Op 07060 [available here]

. . . where the defendant was stopped on a public street, searched, handcuffed and locked in the back of a police cruiser without any explanation of why he was being detained. (Full disclosure: I was the attorney on appeal for Mr. Wiley.) The Fourth Department affirmed the trial court's denial of defense counsel's motion to suppress, holding "[t]he police had the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop and detain defendant for a showup identification procedure." (Wiley, 2006 NY Slip Op 07060.) From the decision:

[A]lthough the officer handcuffed defendant prior to transporting him to the crime scene for the showup identification procedure, defendant was not taken to the police station at that time, the conversation between defendant and the officer was congenial, and the crime scene was a short distance from the location where defendant was stopped by the officer. The record further establishes that defendant was not interrogated during the brief detention and, indeed, the officer stopped defendant from speaking to him, administered Miranda warnings and discontinued conversation with defendant until after the showup identification occurred. [...] Thus, we agree with the People that the police "diligently pursued a minimally intrusive means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel suspicion quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant."
(Id. at __.)

The only difference between Wiley and the facts of Mc Clain is that the officers drew their guns in Mc Clain. I have my doubts as to whether that should make a difference--it seems a reasonable, innocent person in Mr. Wiley's shoes would not have felt free to leave the officer's presence once he was stopped, frisked, searched, handcuffed, locked in the back of the police cruiser and transported without explanation. But even assuming a person would feel free to leave after being cuffed and locked in a police car, I gotta believe even the most naive person in the world would feel less-than-free if, during the course of casual conversation, the officer read Miranda warnings (i.e. the hallmark of an arrest to anyone who has watched any primetime cop show in the last 20 years). But I digress.

People v Dozier, 2006 NY Slip Op 07053 [available here]

From the other end of the "custody" spectrum comes Dozier. Unlike the defendants in Mc Clane and Wiley, Ms. Dozier was not plucked from a public street, was not subject to a frisk or search, and was not handcuffed. Rather, "[d]efendant willingly accompanied the police to the police station, she was not handcuffed, she was offered food and beverages, and she was not questioned in an accusatory fashion." (Dozier, 2006 NY Slip Op 07053.) On those facts, the Fourth Department had no trouble finding "a reasonable person innocent of any crime would not have believed that he or she was in custody, and thus warnings were not required." (Id. at __.)

AD4: Defendant must be allowed to withdraw entire plea if agreed sentence is illegal as to one count

People v Ciccarelli, 2006 NY Slip Op 06655 [available here].)

The defendant pled guilty back in 1989 to one count of Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the First Degree (CSCS 1st) and one count of Attempted CSCS 1st. The parties to the plea were operating under the understanding that Attempted CSCS1st was a class A-II felony, and the agreed-upon sentence (4 years to life) reflected this erroneous understanding. Attempted CSCS 1st is actually an A-I felony, making the agreed-upon sentence illegal. Defendant made a 440 motion to withdraw his entire plea based on the illegal sentence; the 440 court only allowed him to withdraw his plea to the Attempted CSCS1st count, and let the plea and sentence on the other count stand. The Fourth Department reversed:

The court erred, however, in granting the motion only to the extent of vacating the sentence imposed on that count and permitting defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty on that count. "Where the plea bargain includes a sentence which is illegal because the minimum imposed is less than that required by law, . . . the proper remedy is to vacate the sentence and afford . . . defendant, having been denied the benefit of the bargain, the opportunity to withdraw the plea" . Further, "[i]nasmuch as the entire sentence is part and parcel of the plea bargain,' it must be vacated in its entirety regardless of whether portions of the sentence are legal".

(Ciccarelli, 2006 NY Slip Op 06655 [citations omitted].)

New decisions from the AD4 coming this afternoon.

AD4: Crawford v Washington not applicable at probation violation hearing

People v Brown, 2006 NY Slip Op 06706 [available here]

In another less-than-surprising decision, the Fourth Department confirms that the testimonial hearsay rule promulgated by the Supreme Court in Crawford v Washington (based on the Confrontation Clause) does not apply at any proceeding other than a full criminal trial; in this case a probation revocation hearing. (Brown, 2006 NY Slip Op 06706.) As I noted here, the Supreme Court telegraphed as much in Crawford.

If at first you don't succeed . . .

People v Rodriquez, 2006 NY Slip Op 06683 [available here]

On the day before he killed a woman, Mr. Rodriquez tried to purchase a rifle. Having failed to acquire the gun, defendant opted for a less conventional method of murder--he doused his victim in gasoline and fired a flare gun at her. (Rodriquez, 2006 NY Slip Op 06683.) The trial court allowed the evidence of the failed rifle purchase, and the Fourth Department affirmed because the "testimony concerning his failed attempt to purchase a rifle . . . provided necessary background information and completed the narrative of events." (Id.) Of course. Because if you did not know that defendant tried to buy a gun the day before, you might attribute innocent intent to defendant's attempt to light his gasoline-soaked victim on fire with a flare gun.

AD4: Police officer's creepy come-ons not misdemeanor stalking

People v Watson, 2006 NY Slip Op 06680 [available here

A police officer in Jamestown, New York was charged with multiple counts of Stalking in the Fourth Degree (a B misdemeanor) and Stalking in the Third Degree (an A misdemeanor) based on his aggressive perverted pursuit of at least three women. The B misdemeanor counts were based on the allegations of three women that the cop (among many other things) "exposed his genitals", made inappropriate phone calls, "would sit outside ... in his patrol vehicle and shine the vehicle's lights into her bedroom, and he would grab his genitals while asking her questions such as whether she had dreamed about him." (Watson, 2006 NY Slip Op 06680.) The trial court dismissed some of the B misdemeanor Stalking counts because the women testified that, while they were creeped out by defendant, they were never afraid for their physical safety. The Fourth Department affirmed, noting that a required element of Stalking in the Fourth Degree is that defendant "knew or should have known that his conduct was likely to cause reasonable fear of material harm to the physical health or safety of the women", and the women's testimony that they harbored no such fear precluded the charge. (Id.)

Similar reasoning underpinned the dismissal of the A misdemeanor stalking counts (also affirmed by the AD4). To sustain that charge, the People had to prove that defendant's conduct "was likely to cause such person to reasonably fear . . . the commission of a sex offense against . . .such person [...]." (Id..) Again, the defendants were weirded out by defendant's conduct, but all testified that they did not believe defendant would actually commit a sexual assault. Given that testimony, the Fourth Department held the trial court's dismissal of the A misdemeanor stalking charges was appropriate.

Pigott's Last Packet

Justice Pigott handed down his leftover decisions last Friday (presumably on his way out of town for Albany), a week ahead of the rest of the Court. I'll post on the significant criminal decisions from this last packet between now and Friday (when the rest of the decisions from a busy September term come down).

Small town "justice"

The New York Times has a fascinating series of articles up exploring the system of Town and Village Justice Courts in New York. You can read the whole thing here. In my hometown, the village Justice also ran the "Chuck Wagon" (a converted Winnebago serving hamburgers and hotdogs) at the County Fair.

UPDATE: Nicole at Sui Generis links to the same article and has her own Town Court war stories here.

UPDATE 2: Part two of the series is up here.

UPDATE 3: And Part three is here.

AD4: warrantless arrest for violation only appropriate where offense occurs within officer's presence

People v Solomon, 2006 NY Slip Op 05459 [available here]

A woman called 911 and told them that defendant would not leave her house. When the police responded, defendant was seen "leaving the caller's home." (People v Solomon, 2006 NY Slip Op 05459.) Defendant was chased down and arrested, and was eventually charged with harassment in the second degree (a violation). Citing CPL 140.10, the Fourth Department held that, because the alleged harassment did not occur in the presence of the arresting officer, the warrantless arrest was illegal and the evidence found subsequent to arrest should have been suppressed. (See id. [The police may arrest a person for a violation without a warrant when, inter alia, they have 'reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed such offense in [t]heir presence'. The warrantless arrest of defendant for a violation, i.e., harassment, that did not occur in the presence of the arresting officers was therefore illegal [...].")

AD4: legal sufficiency issue still not preserved if trial defense counsel fails to renew TOD

People v Adamus, 2006 NY Slip Op 05520 [available here]

Just a reminder: if you are a practicing criminal defense attorney in the Fourth Department, you must renew any motion for a trial order of dismissal at the close of all proof to preserve any legal sufficiency issues for appeal. (See People v Adamus, 2006 NY Slip Op 05520 ["By failing to renew his motion to dismiss the indictment at the close of the proof, defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction"].) Carry on.

AD4: more than mere residence required to prove defendant constructively possessed drugs found in roommate's dresser

People v Gautreauz-Perez, 2006 NY Slip Op 05519 [available here]

Defendant was charged with Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree after police found cocaine "in a closed dresser drawer" in her roommate's bedroom. She was convicted after trial; the Fourth Department reversed and held her conviction was not supported by legally sufficient evidence. From the decision:

The mere fact that defendant lived at the residence where the drugs were found is, without more, legally insufficient to establish that she exercised the requisite dominion and control over the drugs "by a sufficient level of control over the area in which the [drugs were] found". Indeed, the evidence at trial established that only male clothing and male shoes were found in the southeast bedroom and that a male roommate of defendant was involved in a drug deal previously observed by the officers while on surveillance.

(People v Gautreauz-Perez, 2006 NY Slip Op 05519.)

A reassuring case for anyone who is unwittingly sharing his or her apartment with a drug dealer.

AD4: "right to be left alone" alive and well in New York

People v Lobley, 2006 NY Slip Op 05444 [available here]

Police responded to a citizen complaint of drug dealing at a certain address in Buffalo, and saw defendant hanging out with a group of men on the stoop. One of the officers "made eye contact with defendant and asked him to 'stop', [and] defendant ran into the downstairs apartment of the residence." (People v Lobley, 2006 NY Slip Op 05444.) The police chased defendant and, after being let into the apartment by an unidentified woman, observed defendant with a gun inside the apartment. Not done yet, "Defendant threw the gun into the air and ran through the backyard." (Id. at __.) He was caught and arrested later. The trial court refused to suppress the gun, and the Fourth Department reversed. The People on appeal conceded that the police did not have the requisite "reasonable suspicion" to justify the initial chase of the defendant, but instead argued that "the illegal pursuit ended when the police reached the locked door and that, when the door was opened, the observation of the police of defendant holding a gun provided probable cause for his arrest." (Id. at __.) The AD4 rejected this bit of constructive legal time travel. After first noting that flight alone "or even in conjunction with equivocal circumstances" is insufficient to justify pursuit, the Court held,

When the officers first observed defendant, he was imply standing next to a group of men seated on the stoop, and '[d]efendant's later conduct cannot validate an encoutner that was not justified at its inception'. Indeed, "[i]f these circumstances could combine with flight to justify pursuit, then in essence the right to inquire would be tantamount to the right to seize, and there would, in fact, be no right "to be let alone."

(Id. at __.)

It is worth noting that the New York constitution does the heavy lifting here, as the U.S. Supreme Court has arguably held the mere fact of flight sufficient to justify police pursuit. (See Illinois v Wardlow, 528 US 119 [2000].)

Upon further review . . .

People v Linnan, 2006 NY Slip Op 05482 [available here

Back in November, 2005, the Fourth Department considered Paul Linnan’s appeal from his murder conviction. The transcripts from jury voir dire showed that a prospective juror indicated she would have a hard time remaining fair and impartial if forced to look at gruesome photographs. But instead of reversing Mr. Linnan’s conviction (based on the juror’s failure to give adequate unequivocal assurances of impartiality), the Fourth Department held decision and remanded to the trial court. Why? Because in their brief on appeal, “the People assert[ed] that the exchange attributed by the transcript to the prospective juror not challenged for cause ‘may well have’ involved the prospective juror challenged for cause, and that the prospective juror challenged for cause may thereby have rehabilitated herself as an impartial juror.” (People v Linnan, 23 AD2d 1013, 1013 [4th Dept 2005].) This seemed odd to me at the time.

So what happened on remand? The People “in effect conceded that the prospective juror challenged for cause was not the same prospective juror who made the expurgatory statements [...].” (People v Linnan, 2006 NY Slip Op 05482.) In other words, the People’s assertion in their first appellate brief was so much hog-wash, and the People conceded as much on remand. Meanwhile, Mr. Linnan’s reversal was delayed 8 months.

Save some for the rest of us

People v Carter, 2006 NY Slip Op 05448 [available here]

Even while waging an (ultimately) unsuccesful campaign for mayor of Rochester, defense attorney John Parrinello managed to get the Fourth Department to reverse his client's conviction for various counts of Sodomy--on four separate legal grounds. Way to hog the issues. The Fourth Department agreed with Mr. Parrinello that, 1) the trial court erred in refusing to allow Mr. Parrinello to present "testimony concerning the reputation of the victim" where a proper foundation was laid and Parrinello agreed "to limit his direct examination of the witnesses to the general reputation of the victim in the community for truth and veracity"; 2) the trial court "also committed reversible error in allowing the People to present the testimony of a witness concerning his sexual acts with defendant" where the sex acts were consensual; 3) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during opening argument, summation and cross-examination of defense witnesses (i.e. continually referring to defendant as a dangerous sexual predator, among other things), and; 4) the search warrant was overbroad "because it allowed the police to obtain evidence not specifically connected to the alleged crimes related to the victim." (People v Carter, 2006 NY Slip Op 05448.)

Given the Fourth Department's multiple pro-defendant reversals in the June packet, and further given this case (that contains more grounds for substantive pro-defendant reversals than usually show up in a whole term's worth of decisions), I can only conclude that either, 1) the end is near, or 2) the Fourth Department will not reverse another conviction until April, 2010.

AD4: Crawford does not apply to suppression hearing

People v Brink, 2006 NY Slip Op 05428 [available here]

In a decision confirming what was already suspected, the Fourth Department held in People v Brink that the so-called "testimonial" rule of Crawford v Washington [541 US 36] is a trial right that does not apply at a pretrial suppression hearing. From the decision:

We reject the contention of defendant that Crawford v Washington applies to his pretrial suppression hearing and that reversal is required because his right of confrontation was violated at the hearing. As the Supreme Court has written, "[t]he right [of] confrontation is basically a trial right." Indeed, "the interests at stake in a suppression hearing are of a lesser magnitude than those in the criminal trial itself. At a suppression hearing, the [suppression] court may rely on hearsay and other evidence, even though that evidence would not be admissible at trial."

(People v Brink, 2006 NY Slip Op 05428.)

Unlike the murkiness surrounding the definition of "testimonial", the Supreme Court has pretty consistently telegraphed that it will apply the Confrontation Clause formulation of Crawford only at trial. So the Fourth Department's decision refusing to apply Crawford at sentencing is no big surprise.

AD4: refusal to allow cross-examination concerning motive to fabricate rape allegations = denial of right to present a defense

People v Mc Farley, 2006 NY Slip Op 05447 [available here]

At his trial on allegations of raping a high school student, defendant Mc Farley attempted to elicit testimony that the complainant and her mom had a monetary motive for making the allegations, and that the complainant had commented to a friend (after watching the movie "Wild Things") that she would like to try falsely accusing somebody of rape. The trial court refused to allow defense counsel to explore these areas, and specifically restricted counsel's cross-examination accordingly. The Fourth Department reversed, holding that the trial court's ruling thwarted the defendant's right to present a defense. From the decision:

Defendant was entitled to explore his theory that the victim and her mother had a profit motive in accusing defendant of rape five months after the alleged rape occurred and his theory that the victim accused defendant of rape based on a movie she had seen.

[quotes from United States Supreme Court cases guaranteeing the right to present a defense and to cross-examine witnesses omitted]

Here, defendant sought to cross-examine a witness with respect to a statement by the victim's mother in which she had threatened to "sue." In addition, he sought to present testimony that the victim had watched the movie "Wild Things," which dealt with high school students who made false allegations of rape against a teacher, and that the victim had commented to a defense witness that she would like to "try it on somebody." "[E]xtrinsic proof tending to establish a reason to fabricate is never collateral," and the court erred in precluding defense counsel from presenting that proof.

(People v Mc Farley, cite.)

I'm sure there is a Denise Richards joke in here somewhere.

AD4: No cocaine, no arrest

People v Ortiz, 2006 NY Slip Op 05409 [available here]

The police stopped the vehicle driven by Mr. Ortiz after listening in on some phone calls where a sale of cocaine between Ortiz and a police informant was discussed. But despite this bit of intelligence, a search of Mr. Ortiz and his car turned up no cocaine. Undeterred, the police (there were five officers on the scene at this point) placed Mr. Ortiz in the back of a police cruiser and continued to question him. After some "accusatory" questioning, Mr. Ortiz consented to a search of his home (where cocaine was later found) and signed a statement admitting to possessing cocaine. The trial court refused to suppress the cocaine and the statement, and the Fourth Department reversed. From the AD4's opinion:

The record establishes that the police lacked probable cause for the roadside arrest inasmuch as the search of defendant's person and vehicle did not result in the recovery of any illegal substances or any other basis upon with to arrest defendant. [...] Indeed, we note that the People do not contend on appeal that the police had probable cause for a roadside arrest but, rather, they contend that the police arrested defendant only after drugs were found at his home following his consent to that search and defendant had signed a statement in which he admitted that he sold drugs. "The fact that the police were ultimately successful does not justify defendant's arrest. The police are not at liberty to arrest and hold a suspect while they search for evidence sufficient to justify their action."

(People v Ortiz, __ AD3d at __.)

A particularly nice aspect of this decision is that the Fourth Department found the defendant subject to a "roadside arrest" (i.e. in custody for purposes of triggering a full-blown probable cause analysis) when the defendant was placed in the back of the police cruiser at the scene. Notably, the Court went out of its way to note the defendant was not handcuffed and that he was "asked" (and not ordered) to "sit in the police vehicle." (Id. at __.) Nevertheless, the Court found defendant to be under de facto arrest at this point, and not subject to the amorphous, supposedly less onerous "investigatory detention" (justifiable on the less stringent showing of "reasonable suspicion"). Pegging the precise moment of de facto arrest is critical in this type of case, because only after a de facto arrest is shown is the probable cause requirement triggered. That the Fourth Department found a "roadside arrest" occurred even absent handcuffing or the use of coercion to get defendant into the police vehicle is encouraging.

Justice Pigott nominated to Court of Appeals

This past Friday, Governor Pataki announced his nomination to the Court of Appeals of Justice Eugene Pigott, Jr., currently presiding Justice of the Fourth Department. If confirmed, Justice Pigott will take the seat currently occupied by Judge G.B. Smith. The New York Law Journal has a nice article about the appointment here.

AD4: not all blue cars are created equal

People v Taylor, 2006 NY Slip Op 05429 [available here]

At about 10:30 p.m., a police radio call "reported that 'two male blacks' . . . had committed an armed robbery in the area of Conkey Avenue and were observed leaving the scene in a 'light blue Ford Contour'". (People v Taylor, cite.) About 2 1/2 hours later, police officers "observed a light blue Mercury Mystique containing two occupants at the intersection of Clifford Avenue and Conkey Avenue." (Id.) Although not able "to discern the race of the occupants", the police pulled over the Mystique with the stated intention to identify the occupants and question them about the robbery. (Id. at __.) The trial court upheld the stop, and the Fourth Department reversed; from the AD4 decision:

It is well settled that the police may stop a vehicle based upon a "reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants of the vehicle have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime". [...] Here, the facts known to the police, along with any rational inferences to be drawn therefrom, were insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants of the vehicle had committed the robbery. Indeed, the stated purpose of the stop was to "identify the occupants of the vehicle" and to "ask them if they had possibly known anything" about the robbery, and we thus conclude that the stop was not based on the requisite reasonable suspicion.

(Id. at __ [citations omitted].)

As a someone who drives, I find it comforting that the Fourth Department has ruled that you cannot be stopped and questioned by the police for driving the same color car as a suspected criminal.

CA: trial court must charge jury that victim's prior threats may be used to determine initial aggressor

People v Petty, 2006 NY Slip Op 05232 [available here]

In an opinion that escaped my attention when it was handed down about a month ago, the Court of Appeals held that a trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that a victim's prior threats could be considered by the jury not only in determining the reasonableness of defendant's conduct but also to determine whether the victim was the initial aggressor for justification purposes. Yes, I just started a post with a 66-word sentence.

The defendant in People v Petty shot his victim in the back of the neck. At trial, the defendant argued that his use of force was justified based on the victim's prior threats against defendant's life. Defense counsel asked that the jury be charged that these prior threats could be considered in determining whether the victim was the initial aggressor. The trial court refused to give the requested charge, and instructed the jury instead that the prior threats were relevant only in determining the reasonableness of defendant's use of force. From the Court's opinion:

Here, having instructed the jury on the use of Torrence's prior threats against defendant for the purpose of determining defendant's reasonableness, the trial court, based on this Court's long-standing precedent, should have also instructed the jury that, for its initial aggressor determination, it was permitted to use the prior threats that it heard throughout the trial.

(People v Petty, 2006 NY Slip Op 05232.)

Despite finding error, the Court declined to reverse defendant's conviction; the Court concluded that the People disproved the justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt and the charging error was therefore harmless. (Id. at __.)

Upcoming arguments at the Court of Appeals

Three cases out of the Fourth Department are currently pending argument before the Court of Appeals (Big Hat Tip to the fine folks at the Center for Appellate Litigation). Here they are, in no particular order:

People v Bolling: the issue in Bolling is whether a trial court is required to instruct the jurors that they must acquit defendant of all charges (including lesser-included offenses) if they find defendant justified as to a top count. Both the First and Second Departments require such a charge, and failure to give it is reversible error. In Bolling, the Fourth Department refused to reverse based on a trial court's failure to give the requested charge, and recognized the split thus created among the Appellate Division Departments. See my previous post on Bolling here. The case will be argued October 12, 2006. (Full disclosure: I am Mr. Bolling's attorney and will be arguing his case before the Appeals.)

People v Cagle: the defendant in Cagle was sentenced as a second felony offender based on the trial court's determination that he had been convicted of a prior felony within 10 years of the commission of the crime he was being sentenced on. In calculating the 10-year period, the trial court excluded time defendant spent on work release supervision, reasoning that "work release" was the equivalent of "incarceration" for purposes of tolling the 10-year time period. The Fourth Department, in a 3-2 decision, affirmed the trial court's decision and held that "the tolling provision applies to the period of time in which defendant was in the day-reporting work release program inasmuch as he remained under the control and custody of the Department of Correctional Services." (Cagle, 26 AD3d 735 [2006].) As the dissenters noted, the Second Department has held just the opposite, and the Justice Pine (one of the AD4 dissenters) granted leave to resolve the question. The case will be argued October 19, 2006.

People v Carter: the primary issue in Carter is whether the trial court erred in failing to charge depraved indifference Assault 1st and intentional Assault 2nd in the alternative. The Fourth Department found the issue to be unpreserved and declined to reach it in the interests of justice.

You can see the entire list of the upcoming Court of Appeals arguments over at the Center for Appellate Litigation.

AD4: Single gunshot to chest insufficient to establish "uncommon brutality" required for depraved indifference murder

People v Packer, 2006 NY Slip Op 05449 [available here]

Continuing on our "depraved indifference" theme, the Fourth Department reversed a defendant's depraved indifference murder conviction where the evidence established only that the defendant shot his victim once in the chest. The facts, as set forth in the Fourth Department's decision:

Without apparent explanation or provocation, defendant removed two pistols from a safe in his bedroom, held up one of the pistols and fired a single fatal shot at the victim. Defendant testified that he did not recall shooting the victim and had no reason to kill her.

(Packer, 2006 NY Slip Op 05449 at __.)

On those facts, the Fourth Department concluded "that 'defendant's conduct may have reflected recklessness but did not fall within the small, and finite, category of cases evidencing utter depravity, uncommon brutality and inhuman cruelty required for depraved indifference murder'." (Id. at __ [citing People v McPherson, 6 NY3d 202, 216.) Instead of dismissing the depraved indifference murder count outright, the Fourth Department took the increasingly favored remedial step of reducing defendant's conviction to manslaughter in the second degree (see my previous post on this trend here).

It is worth noting that the Fourth Department found this issue unpreserved because defendant's motion for a trial order of dismissal was not renewed at the close of all proof; the Fourth Department reads the Court of Appeals' decision in People v Hynes (97 NY2d 56) as requiring a defendant to make a TOD motion at the close of all proof to preserve a legal sufficiency argument for review. (Packer, 2006 NY Slip Op 05449 at __ ["Defendant failed to renew his motion to dismiss at the close of the People's case after presenting evidence and thus failed to preserve [his legal sufficiency arguments] for our review"].) The Fourth Department's reading of Hynes is by no means widely accepted, and the Second Department has specifically rejected AD4's reading of Hynes and held making a TOD motion at the close of the People's case is sufficient to preserve a legal sufficiency argument. (See< People v Soto, 8 AD3d 683 [2d Dept 2004].) The Court of Appeals may get around to resolving these conflicting interpretations of Hynes eventually, but until the Appeals rule on the issue it is clear the Fourth Department will continue to require defense counsel to renew his or her TOD at the close of all proof in order to preserve legal sufficiency issues for review. Mr. Packer got lucky; the Fourth Department decided to reach his legal sufficiency issue in the interest of justice.

CA: "depraved indifference" roundup

In the wake of last week's Feingold decision (overturning People v Register and holding that "depraved indifference" is a culpable mental state), the Court of Appeals did some housekeeping and decided three more cases dealing with "depraved indifference" issues. Here they are, in no particular order:

People v Mancini, __ NY3d __ [available here]

The facts of Mancini fall into the "you can't make this stuff" up category (i.e. death-by-toilet-lid); from the dissent:

According to defendant's trial testimony, after agreeing to a sexual encounter with a 75-year-old man for a specified sum of money and accompanying him to his home, the pair got into the shower. When the man told defendant that he would pay only half of the agreed-upon price, defendant refused to have sex with him. The man responded by grabbing defendant from behind, which led her to believe that she was about to be sexually assaulted. A struggle ensued.

Defendant testified that eventually she got out of the shower, picked up a toilet tank lid and swung the lid in the direction of the man, who had slipped and was now sitting in the tub, striking the lid on the side of the shower. Defendant claimed she swung the lid once more, hitting the man directly on the left side of his head. [...]

Notwithstanding the victim's shattered skull, profuse bleeding and motionless body, defendant told the jury that she "did not think he was hurt that bad", "thought he would need stitches but . . . [that] he would be okay" and that he would "eventually . . . get up and probably call the police himself" and that it was "only a flesh wound."

(Mancini, __ NY3d at __ [Monty Python reference added].)

On those facts, the majority held that "Defendant did not commit depraved indifference murder within the meaning of the statute." (Id. at __.) Judge Graffeo dissented, and would have held that defendant created a grave risk of death by her actions (i.e. bashing the old man in the head with the toilet tank lid) and elevated her score on the "depravity" scale by "abandon[ing] the victim and imped[ing] the possibility of assistance by locking the doors to the garage and bathroom." (Id. at __ [GRAFFEO, J., dissenting].) The majority counters this argument by noting that, if leaving a victim to die is treated as the elevating factor for depraved indifference murder, "[t]hat test would sweep in the vast number of homicides where the killers do not linger with their victims, awaiting aid." (Id. at __.)

People v Atkinson, __ NY3d __ [available here]

In a case interesting for the corrective action taken, the Court in Atkinson agreed that the evidence was insufficient to establish "depraved indifference" murder, but fell short of a straight dismissal. Rather, the Court held that "dismissal of the indictment is neither required nor warranted. The facts are sufficiently different from Payne to enable a jury to reasonably conclude that defendant's actions, although not depraved, were reckless. Among other evidence, testimony at trial could have led a rational jury to infer that the victim moved into a shot that was intended only to scare him." (Atkinson, __ NY3d at __.) Thus, the Court reduced defendant's conviction from "depraved indifference" murder to manslaughter in the second degree. (Id..)

This trend of reducing a depraved indifference murder conviction to manslaughter in the second degree (instead of dismissing the indictment completely and walking a defendant out of prison) has popped up in the Fourth Department. (See People v Packer, 2006 NY Slip Op 05449.) It is an interesting way to solve the counter-intuitive problem inherent in these depraved indifference cases going back to Gonzalez, i.e. completely dismissing a murder indictment where the evidence shows a manifest intent to kill. The first Court of Appeals cases on this issue focused on whether an act manifested such an obvious intent to kill that a conviction based on a lesser, reckless mental state could not be supported by the evidence. (See e.g., People v Gonzalez, 1 NY3d 464 [2004].) Since then, the focus of the Court of Appeals has shifted to the definition of "depravity"; and now that "depravity" is a mental state, it gives appellate courts cover to find conduct reckless but not depraved, and thus salvage a conviction for manslaughter in the second degree. I imagine this will become the favored remedy in cases where an appellate court finds insufficient evidence to support a depraved indifference murder conviction--grant meaningful relief in the form of a reduction to reckless manslaughter, but deny the windfall of a complete dismissal.

The Atkinson decision also held that a defendant does not forfeit "his right to challenge the sufficiency of his conviction for depraved indifference murder by requesting that the jury be charged on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter in the second degree [...]." (Id. at __.) A nice bit of law to have in one's pocket if presenting this issue to one of the preservation-obsessed Appellate Division Departments.

People v Swinton, __ NY3d __ [available here]

In a brief memorandum opinion, the Court reverses a defendant's conviction for assault in the first degree because "the evidence is legally insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants acted with the culpable mental state of depraved indifference." (Swinton, __ NY3d at __.) Without a discussion of the facts, this case is of limited utility; but it is nonetheless nice to see the words "the culpable mental state of depraved indifference" in a post-Feingold decision and confirm that the Feingold decision was not just a prank pulled on New York's criminal defense bar.

Scheduling note

Despite the glut of new cases from the Court of Appeals and Fourth Department yet to be blogged, posting will be light over the next week or so. Regular posting will resume after that.

AD4 Decision Day (June 2006 term)

The Fourth Department handed down decisions from its June, 2006 term today. Usually, the June term is fairly quiet, because the Court does not hear oral argument and thus the only cases decided are those that are marked "submitted", i.e. no oral argument is requested. Usually, an attorney will only submit a case if the issues are not likely to succeed. However, the Court must have had an inordinate amount of cases held over from other terms, because this is truly an unbelievable packet for criminal defendants. In Monroe County alone, 7 of the 11 criminal decisions were substantive pro-defendant reversals or modifications. That clocks out to an incredible 64 percent reversal rate in Monroe County for the June term. The usual reversal rate hovers between 5-10 percent. Needless to say, there are a lot of cases worthy of comment that I will get to in the coming weeks. For tonight, I'll leave you with . . .

People v Simmons, __ AD3d __ [available here]

In a truly tragic case, appellant Leroy Simmons was convicted of criminally negligent homicide when his car slid through a slippery intersection and struck a woman carrying her infant child. Although the woman wasn't injured, her baby was thrown from her arms and died. The facts (from the Court's decision):

The evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, establishes that defendant was driving his vehicle at a rate slightly above the usual speed limit of 30 miles per hour and that, due to road work, 15 miles per hour speed limit signs were posted. The evidence further establishes that defendant belatedly realized that the two victims, a woman and her infant, were in the intersection and that his attempts to stop his vehicle prior to reaching the intersection were futile because the road recently had been resurfaced, resulting in oil and loose gravel on the road. Defendant thus failed to stop at the stop sign, skidded through the intersection and struck the victims, fatally injuring the infant.

(Simmons, __ AD3d at __.)

On those facts, the Court reversed Simmons' conviction for criminally negligent homicide (in the interest of justice, no less), finding that "the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that defendants' acts were 'a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe' under the circumstances." (Id. at __.) The Court concluded that, while Mr. Simmons' actions "'may well constitute civil negligence . . . the [evidence is legally insufficient to] establish criminal negligence'". (Id. at __ [brackets and emphasis in original].)

Justice Martoche dissented, and would not have reached the unpreserved issue in the interest of justice (and in any event would have found "a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences" to support the jury's verdict). (Id. at __ [MARTOCHE, J., dissenting].)

CA overturns Register, holds "depraved indifference to human life is a culpable mental state"

People v Feingold, __ NY3d __ [available here]

Under section 125.25[2] of the Penal Law, a person is guilty of depraved indifference murder if, "when . . . [u]nder circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person." (Penal Law 125.25[2].) Over 20 years ago, the Court of Appeals held that the "under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life" language did not set up an additional mens rea requirement beyond the recklessness expressly stated in the statute; as stated by the Register Court:

This additional requirement refers to neither the mens rea nor the actus reus. If it states an element of the crime at all, it is not an element in the traditional sense but rather a definition of the factual setting in which the risk creating conduct must occur . . . the present statute defines the crime by reference to the circumstances under which it occurs and expressly states that recklessness is the element of mental culpability required. The concept of depraved indifference was retained in the new statute not to function as a mens rea element, but to objectively define the circumstances which must exist to elevate a homicide from manslaughter to murder.

(People v Register, 60 NY2d 270, 277-278 [1983].)

Over the last few years, a majority of the Court of Appeals has fundamentally changed the way the depraved indifference murder statute is applied in practice, culminating in last year's per curiam opinion in People v Suarez that strictly limited the factual scenarios that could support a depraved indifference murder conviction. (See my previous posts on Suarez here and here.) The Court's previous decision in People v Register was the last depraved indifference precedent to escape assault--until today.

By a 4-3 vote, the Court overturned Register today, instead "explicitly" holding "what the Court in Suarez stopped short of saying: depraved indifference to human life is a culpable mental state." (Feingold, __ NY3d at __.) The majority (in a decision written by Hon. G.B. Smith) reasoned that this conclusion was "implicit" in the recent cases overturning depraved indifference murder convictions where a manifestly intentional act was committed or where the necessary wantonness or cruelty was lacking. From the majority decision:

Here, the trial Judge said he would have acquitted defendant of first degree reckless endangerment (fn1) but felt himself prohibited by Register from doing so. [...] Given the trial judge's findings, we cannot affirm the conviction because we cannot conceive that a person may be guilty of a depraved indifference crime without being depravedly indifferent. When a jury (or here, the court at a bench trial) pointedly says that defendant was not depravedly indifferent, it is not our place to say that he was. [...]

We regard this as a juridical imperative, much the same as in any analogous situation. A person accused of stealing may be guilty of larceny, but a guilty verdict may not stand if the jury finds in a special verdict that the defendant did not intend to take anything. So, too, a person may not be said to have acted with the mens rea of depraved indifference when the jury (or court as fact-finder) tells us that he was not depravedly indifferent.

(Id. at __ [footnote added].)

Judge Ciparick dissented, arguing that "nothing is our precedents requires the imposition of a separate culpable mental state--mens rea--to the element of depraved indifference to human life. [...] There is no need that a defendant subjectively harbor a 'wicked' or 'evil' mind, as now required by the majority." (Id. at __, CIPARICK, J., dissenting.)

While concurring in Judge Ciparick's dissent, Chief Judge Kaye dissented separately to protest the majority's "retreat from a core holding of Register--that the requirement that a defendant act 'under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life' does not constitute a mental state." (Id. at __, KAYE, C.J., dissenting.) From Chief Judge Kaye's dissent:

The majority would limit th[e] level of disregard for the lives or safety of others to circumstances where the defendant consciously has in mind the likelihood of injury to innocent persons and nevertheless deliberately chooses to proceed with the dangerous course of conduct.

While I agree that depraved indifference includes these situations, I fail to understand why it must be restricted to such cases. In my view, "utter indifference" to human life easily covers instances in which a person undertaking a mortal act fails to consider the potential impact on his or her neighbors. Indeed, the failure to be at all concerned with the lives of others is the very epitome of depraved indifference, regardless of whether such utter indifference arises from a malicious wickedness toward humanity or, as here, a complete unmindfulness of one's fellows born of total self-absorption.

(Id. at __.)

Finally, Judge Graffeo dissented separately to note that the majority's decision is at odds "with the language of the reckless endangerment statute [and] the prior rationale of this Court." (Id. at __ [GRAFFEO, J., dissenting].)

n.1: This underlying charge in Feingold was reckless endangerment in the first degree, "which provides that a person violates the statute 'when, under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person.'" (Feingold, __ NY3d at __.) The defendant here escaped a depraved indifference charge by sheer luck; although he tried to commit suicide by turning on gas in his apartment and then zonking out on tranquilizers, nobody was killed when his apartment exploded several hours later.

AD4 restricts police officer "expert" testimony

People v Dixon, 815 NYS2d 848 [available here]

Jeremy Dixon was arrested for selling drugs when a narcotics officer saw him exchange an unidentified object for another unidentified object in a drug prone neighborhood. When searched, $52 was found in Mr. Dixon's pocket. At trial, the arresting officer gave his "expert" opinion that the possession of $52 is consistent with an intent to sell drugs. The officer also repeatedly characterized the observed exchange as a "hand-to-hand drug transaction". The Fourth Department found error on both scores (albeit briefly): "We agree with defendant, however, that the court erred in admitting the opinion tesitmony of a police officer that a hand-to-hand drug transaction had occurred and that defendant's possession of $52 was consistent with the sale of drugs." (Dixon, 815 NYS2d at 848.) Nothing too earth shattering here, but it is nice to see the Fourth Department set some limits on this type of "expert" cop testimony.

The more interesting issue on appeal was whether an exchange of one unidentified object for another unidentified object in a drug-prone neighborhood was sufficient to support probable cause for arrest. The Fourth Department rejected appellant's argument that something more was required, but did so without any analysis. (Dixon, 815 NYS2d at 848.)

Not the result Appellant was looking for

People v Thigpen, __ AD3d __ [available here]

Criminal defendants are allowed to appeal once as a matter of right--for the most part, if you got a conviction, you get an appeal. However, it is not always a good idea to avail oneself of that right. The Fourth Department's decision in People v Thigpen illustrates the point. The substantive issues raised by Mr. Thigpen's counsel on appeal were weak, and the Fourth Department rejected them in a few paragraphs. The real kick in the stomach for Mr. Thigpen comes in the last paragraph of the decision:

Finally, we conclude that the sentence of 3 1/2 to 7 years imprisonment is illegal inasmuch as defendant was sentenced as a second felony offender on two class B drug felonies, which in 2003 required a minimum indeterminate sentence of 4 1/2 to 9 years. "Although this issue was not raised before the [sentencing] court or on appeal, we cannot allow an [illegal] sentence to stand". We therefore modify the judgment by vacating the sentence, and we remit the matter to County Court for resentencing.

(People v Thigpen, __ AD3d __.)

Ouch. I guarantee Mr. Thigpen did not expect to come out of his appeal with a longer sentence that he had going in.

AD4: refusal to allow defense to present evidence that placed defendant away from scene of shooting requires reversal

People v Collins, __ AD3d __ [available here]

Defendant Collins was charged with Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree and Reckless Endangerment in the First Degree in connection with a shooting that occurred on the sidewalk in front of a bar. In their Bill of Particulars, the People described the place of the shooting as "in the vicinity of 2261 Fillmore Avenue", the address of the bar. Collins wanted to put on proof that he was inside the bar at the time the shots were fired outside on the street, and thus could not have been the one firing the shots. The trial court would not let the evidence in because the defendant had not previously filed an alibi notice, and the Fourth Department held this was error requiring reversal.

First, the Fourth Department rejected the People's argument that the proposed evidence constituted an "alibi"; as the Court noted, the People drafted their bill of particulars very broadly (as prosecutors are wont to do), and it came back to bite them. The People described the location of the crime as "in the vicinity of 2261 Fillmore Avenue," and the Fourth Department had no problem finding that "the proposed evidence did not establish an alibi because he was in fact 'in the vicinity of 2261 Fillmore Avenue," and thus a notice of alibi was not required." (Collins, __ AD3d at __.)

The Court went on to hold that, even if a notice had been required, the inquiry is not finished. There is no "gotcha" type, technical game to be played when a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense is concerned. Even if evidence can be truly characterized as "alibi" evidence and the statutorily required notice is required, a trial court must still "balance 'the fundamental character of the defendant's right to offer the testimony of witnesses in his favor [pursuant to US Constitution Amendment VI against] . . . the interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice'." (Collins, quoting Taylor v Illinois, 484 US 400, 414-415.)

AD4: preservation not required for argument based on trial court's failure to advise defendant of postrelease supervision at time of plea

People v Simpson, __ AD3d __ [available here]

During a plea colloquy, the trial court must inform a defendant of the "direct consequences" of a plea. A term of postrelease supervision is "a direct consequence of a criminal conviction", and failure of the "trial court to advise of postrelease supervision requires reversal of the conviction." (People Catu, 4 NY3d 242, 244-245 [2005].) Thus, if a defendant is not informed on the record of postrelease supervision, the plea must be vacated. The somewhat open question has always been whether the issue needs to be preserved, i.e. does a defendant have to make a 440 motion to vacate his plea or otherwise protest the trial court's failure to include the postrelease supervision on the record before challenging the plea on appeal? The Court of Appeals decision in Catu certainly suggests that preservation is not required, unequivocally holding that "the failure of a court to advise of postrelease supervision requires reversal of conviction." (Catu, 4 NY3d at 245.) The Fourth Department expressly decided the question in the Simpson decision handed down last Friday, and confirmed the implication of Catu; from the decision:

Defendant contends that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because County Court failed to advise him of the mandatory period of postrelease supervision at the time of the plea orat the sentencing proceeding and he had no notice of the mandatory period of postrelease supervision inasmuch as the court did not impose a period of postrelease supervision at sentencing (cf. People v Vance, 27 AD3d 1015). We agree. "[T]he failure of a court to advise of postrelease supervision requires reversal of the conviction" (People v Catu, 4 NY3d 242, 245). To the extent that prior decisions of this Court would require preservation of defendant's contention (see e.g. People v Pan Zhi Feng, 15 AD3d 862, lv denied 5 NY3d 809, 812; People v Roddy, 295 AD2d 965), those decisions are no longer to be followed.

(Simpson, __ AD3d at __.)

This decision clears up what was sometimes a problem for defendants trying to raise this issue. If a defendant argued on a 440 motion to the trial court that the postrelease supervision was not on the record, the trial court could duck the issue by claiming the argument could be raised on direct appeal. If a defendant decided to raise the issue for the first time on direct appeal, the Fourth Department would sometimes hold a 440 motion was necessary to preserve the issue. It was the classic "go ask your father/go ask your mother" situation. The Simpson decision eliminates this problem and brings some clarity to a previously murky area of law.

Note, though, that the Court goes out of its way to note that the postrelease supervision was not mentioned at the plea colloquy and not imposed at sentencing. (Id.) This could be significant. I have seen cases where the postrelease supervision is not part of the plea colloquy, but is mentioned by the judge at sentencing (i.e. "I hereby sentence you to X number of years to be followed by 5 years postrelease supervision"). In that case, I could see the Fourth
Department requiring some sort of objection at sentencing to preserve the issue for review.

CA: trial court's failure to submit CPW3 reviewable, but not an abuse of discretion

People v Leon, __ NY3d __ [available here]

Rolando Leon was "involved in a dispute with another drug dealer, Hattie Dukes." (Leon, _ NY3d at __.) Apparently not one to reason with his adversaries, Leon "got a gun from under his mattress, went to where Dukes and his girlfriend were quarelling, and killed Dukes by shooting her in the face." (Id. at __.) Leon claimed self-defense; the jury believed him and acquitted Leon of murder. However, the jury did convict Leon of Criminal Possession of a Weapon (CPW) in the Second Degree. Leon had been charged by indictment with both CPW2 and CPW3; the Court notes the difference:

The People charged defendant with second-degree criminal possession on the theory that he possessed a loaded firearm "with intent to use the same unlawfully against another". The indictment also contained a charge of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, which is committed by possessing a loaded firearm anywhere except in one's home or place of business.

(Id. at __.)

Defense counsel asked that both CPW2 and CPW3 be submitted to the jury; the trial court refused. Since CPW3 is not a lesser-included offense of CPW2, the Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's refusal to submit the count for an abuse of discretion. From the decision:

The problem in this case exists because criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree is not a "lesser included offense" of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Rather, the two are "non-inclusory concurrent counts" (see CPL Ÿ 300.30 [3], [4]); it is possible to commit the greater offense without committing the lesser one. Second-degree criminal possession, in the form of possession of a loaded firearm with intent to use it unlawfully against another, can be committed anywhere, but possession of a loaded firearm constitutes the third-degree crime charged here only when it does not occur in the defendant's home or place of business. [...]

If the crime defendant asked to have submitted to the jury had been a lesser included offense, the court would have been required to grant his request "if there [was] a reasonable view of the evidence which would support a finding that the defendant committed such lesser offense but did not commit the greater" (CPL 300.50 [1]; see CPL Ÿ 300.50 [2]). But because the two offenses are non-inclusory, the submission of the less serious count, even if there was evidence to support it, was not mandatory. [...] [W]hether to submit it was a matter for the trial court's discretion under CPL ß 300.40 (3) and (4). "With respect to non-inclusory concurrent counts, the court may in its discretion submit one or more or all thereof" (CPL Ÿ 300.40 [3] [a]).[...]

(Id. at __.)

The Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion, since the idea that the defendant could have simply possessed the gun with no unlawful purpose (and therefore been guilty of CPW3 instead of CPW2) was "farfetched" and a defendant is not entitled to submit a lesser crime to the jury in hopes of jury nullification. (Id. at __.)

The Court also rejected the People's argument that "a discretionary ruling in their favor cannot be challenged," holding that the CPL section cited by the People in support of their argument was not applicable "to already discretionary rulings like the one at issue in this case." (Id. at __.)

More over the next few days on the new decisions handed down by the Fourth Department last Friday.

AD4: testimonial hearsay not admissable at persistent violent felony offender hearing

People v Williams, __ AD3d __ [available here]

Deciding an issue of first impression in New York, the Fourth Department holds in a decision handed down today that the "testimonial" hearsay rule promulgated in Crawford v Washington applies at persistent violent felony offender hearings in New York to exclude testimonial hearsay absent an opportunity to cross-examine the declarants. I have discussed this previously open question here.

At issue in Williams was "an affidavit of the Criminal History Bureau" submitted by the People at defendant's persistent violent felony offender hearing to prove up the fact of the requisite prior convictions. As described by the Court, the affidavit

referred to four fingerprint cards of "Michael Williams" that were obtained in connection with the present felony and three earlier felonies that occurred in 1977, 1980 and 1995. The director asserted in his affidavit that the fingerprint cards were compared and that "staff determined" that the fingerprints on those cards were the fingerprints of the same Michael C. Williams who was before the court at sentencing.

(Williams, __ AD3d at __.)

Although noting that the right on confrontation is a trial right that does not usually apply at sentencing, the Fourth Department nevertheless concluded that New York's recidivist sentencing statute specifically makes the right of confrontation (and by extension the rule set forth in Crawford v Washington) applicable at a persistent felony offender hearing and the fingerprint affidavit should have been excluded. From the decision:

We conclude . . . that the affidavit of the director of the Criminal History Bureau is not admissible under New York law, even in a sentencing proceeding. [...]

[T]he director's affidavit was testimonial in nature, and the "'testimonial' statements [in the adffidavit were] not previously subjected to cross-examination [and thus were] inadmissible against [this] criminal defendant". At a hearing to determine whether a defendant is a persistent felony offender, "[t]he burden of proof is upon the people and a finding that the defendant has been subjected to a predicate violent felony conviction must be based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence admissible under the rules applicable to a trial of the issue of guilt." (CPL 400.15[7][a]; see CPL 400.16[2].) Here, the affidavit of the director would not be admissible at trial, and thus cannot constitute the requisite proof.

(Id. at __ [citations omitted].)

This is a welcome result--given the enormous stakes involved in persistent felony hearings (potentially enhancing a defendant's sentence to 25 years to life), it makes sense that defendants should enjoy the same evidentiary protections at a persistent felony offender hearing that they would at trial. The legislature necessarily intended that this should be so when it specified in section 400.15[7][a] of the CPL that the prior felonies must be proved by "evidence admissible under the rules of evidence applicable to a trial of the issue of guilt." (CPL 400.15[7][a].) Today's decision in Williams vindicates that intent.

AD4: Alford plea does not warrant point assessment for "failing to take responsibility" at SORA classification

People v Gonzalez, __ AD3d __ [available here]

Remember back in this post when I explained how the sex offender classification system in New York is points based, and if certain facts are present points are assessed? Under one of those categories, a defendant is given ten points if he does not accept responsibility for his actions. In Gonzalez, the defendant was assessed points under this category because his sex crime conviction was based on an Alford plea (where the defendant does not admit guilt or wrongdoing, but agrees to plead guilty to a crime [sometimes called a "no contest" plea]) to sex abuse in the first degree. The Fourth Department held that a defendant's Alford plea , "without more, does not warrant the board's assessment of 10 points for the purported failure of defendant to accept responsibility for his conduct [...]." (People v Gonzalez, __ AD3d at __.) The Court also noted that the points for being "armed with a dangerous instrument" (an element of sex abuse first) could not be given solely based on the guilty plea, because the Alford plea colloquy contain no admissions of facts. (See id.)

The only other decision worth noting from the Fourth Department's April term is People v Robinson, if only for the study in human persistence it provides. The facts were explained by the Court:

The first transaction involved the stabbing of a victim; the second involved tampering with a witness to the stabbing; the third involved tampering with the same witness on a different occasion and attempting to bribe him; and the fourth involved the shooting and attempted murder of the stabbing victim the day before trial on the stabbing incident was scheduled to begin.

(People v Robinson, __ AD3d at __.)

If at first you don't succeed, I guess. The legal question was a bit of a letdown; while noting that defendants generally have the right to be present "during Ventimiglia hearings or sidebar conferences", the "defendant's right to be present was not violated in this case because the only issue discussed was whether the testimony was more prejudicial than probative, and thus there was no potential for meaningful participation on defendant's part." (Id. at __.)

CA:"trial court did not abuse its discretion by calling 44 people for simultaneous voir dire questioning"

People v Serrano, __ NY3d __ [available here]

Apparently wanting to limit the number of rounds required to complete jury selection, the trial court in Serrano "called 44 individuals for simultaneous questioning, placing twelve in the jury box and the others in four front rows of the courtroom." (Serrano, __ NY3d at __.) Defense counsel objected, "stating that he would have difficulty conducting an effective voir dire since many prospective jurors sat behind him." (Id. at __.) Noting that the relevant statute only provides that "not less than twelve" prospective jurors are to be called at a time, the Court held:

Tellingly, the legislature set no upper limit for the number of prospective jurors, thus allowing judges discretion to make their courtrooms, and voir dire, more efficient. Defendant has not demonstrated that he could not conduct a voir dire by the trial court's decision to expand the jury box. During voir dire, counsel expressed no inability to observe, hear or assess the demeanor and qualifications of, or exercise challenges against, any prospective jurors. There was also no evidence of prejudice on the record at the end of voir dire. We therefore conclude that there was no abuse of discretion [...]

(Id at __.)

Nothing groundbreaking here, but lets hope trial courts don't get wind of it and start doing voir dire in one pass.

CA: Navy court martial conviction for "indecent assault" not classifiable sex offense under NY SORA

People v Kennedy, __ NY3d __ [available here]

This time last year, the Fourth Department held that a Navy court martial conviction for "indecent assault" was a classifiable offense under the section of New York's SORA law defining a SORA-eligible sex crime to include "a felony in any other jurisdiction for which the offender is required to register as a sex offender in the jurisdiction in which the conviction occurred." (People v Kennedy, 20 AD3d 137, ___ [4th Dept 2005].) The Fourth Department noted that the certain Navy regulations require the Navy to notify state and local law enforcement of an offender's Navy sex crime convictions and to further provide information to the offender concerning any registration requirements. (Id. at __.) This was the equivalent of "registering" in the "jurisdiction in which the conviction occurred" for purposes of the SORA statute and thus (according to the Fourth Department) a person convicted of "indecent assault" by a Navy court martial was required to register as a sex offender in New York. See my previous post on Kennedy here.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Fourth Department on this issue in a decision handed down today. From Judge Rosenblatt's majority opinion:

County Court's determination fails because the second element of section 168-a(2)(d)(ii) requires that the conviction result in the offender's obligation to register in the "other jurisdiction,", i.e. where defendant was convicted--here, the United States Navy. The People argue that Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5800.14 obligates defendant to register with the Navy. It does not. This "Instruction" is a notification order directed to "all Ships and Stations"; by its own terms, it places responsibility to provide notification not on the offender but on the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the Navy Personnel Command, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the "Convening Authority or Convening Authority's Designee" for each court-martial, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service and the Judge Advocate General of the Navy.

The People have presented no evidence of any kind suggesting that naval sex offenders must register with the Navy or have any ongoing obligation to keep the Navy informed of their whereabouts once they leave the service. Furthermore, the People have presented no evidence that the Navy or Department of Defense maintains any registry or equivalent database; if there is no registry, there can be no registration and no registrants. Because the People have not shown that defendant ever had any obligation to register with the other jurisdiction, they have not met the second statutory requirement for registration in New York.

(People v Kennedy, __ NY3d at __.)

Judge Graffeo concurred separately "to highlight the need for legislative reconsideration." (Id. at __.)

I do not have a whole lot to say about Kennedy that I didn't say when the Fourth Department first decided the case last year (see my previous post here).

The Fourth Department will hand down decisions from its May, 2006 term this Friday. I will post on the few leftover decisions from the Court's April term between now and then.